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RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS: "OFFHAND COMMENTS"
OR "INTERROGATION"?
INTRODUCTION
In the past fourteen years, the Supreme Court has had several opportu-
nities to add gloss to the controversial standards set forth in Miranda v. Ari-
zona.1 That decision required that any person subjected to "custodial
interrogation" be apprised of his right to remain silent, of the fact that any
statement could be used against him, and of his right to counsel, retained or
appointed.
2
In the years immediately following Miranda, the Warren Court read
these requirements liberally, and in borderline cases tended to find confes-
sions inadmissible. 3 With the Burger Court came a reluctance to extend
Miranda principles beyond those set forth by the Warren Court. Although
the Burger Court repeatedly has been criticized for retreating from the prin-
ciples articulated in Miranda,4 many of the criticized decisions have reflected
more a reluctance to extend the Miranda principles than a retreat from
them.
5
Many of the post-Miranda decisions have been aimed at determining the
definition of "custodial interrogation," for Miranda applies only to such inter-
rogation. Prior to Rhode Islandv. Innis,6 all fifth amendment cases had been
concerned with the question of "custody." 7 Innis is the first Supreme Court
case to address itself to the definition of "interrogation" for Miranda pur-
poses. The definition of "interrogation" that the Court formulated includes
either express questioning or its "functional equivalent." 8 The purpose of
this comment is to examine both the context out of which the decision in
Inni's arose and the implications of the decision for the future.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id at 444.
3. See, e.g., Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968).
4. See generally Keefe, Confessions, Admissions, and the Recent Curtailment of Fifth Amendment
Protection, 51 CONN. B.J. 266 (1977); Picou, Miranda and Escobedo: Warren v. Burger Court Deci-
sions on Fifth Amendment Rights, 4 S.U.L. REv. 175 (1978); Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the
Burger Court, 1977 SUP. CT. REv. 99. But see Sunderland, Self-Incrimination and Constitutional Prin-
ciple: Miranda v. Arizona and Beyond, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 171 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam) (warnings not neces-
sary for questioning in police station when suspect had come voluntarily and was free to leave);
Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (IRS agent who gave inadequate warnings held
not to have violated suspect's rights during questioning in a private residence).
6.. 100 S. Ct. 1682 (1980).
7. E.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
8. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Privilege
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
"[N]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."9 This "privilege against self-incrimination" had its origins
in opposition to the oath ex offico used by the English ecclesiastical courts,
the Court of the Star Chamber, and the Court of the High Commission.' 0
This oath allowed officials to cause an individual to be brought before the
court and made to respond to any questions put to him. One who refused to
be sworn, or, having been sworn, refused to testify, was declared pro con-
fesso-the legal equivalent of having confessed and been convicted.
A landmark case in the development of the privilege was the trial of
John Lilburn, who refused to take the oath or to answer against himself. I
In 1645, the House of Lords ordered his sentence vacated as "illegal, most
unjust, and against the liberty of the subject and law of the land, and Magna
Charta, and unfit to continue upon record.' 2 Within five years of this deci-
sion, the privilege was established in the New England states and in Vir-
ginia.' 3 It evolved through colonial history as a privilege against physical
compulsion and against the moral compulsion that an oath to one's God
commands.' 4 Upon independence, seven of the new states incorporated the
privilege into their constitutions. '5 In all of the debates on the federal con-
stitution there were few allusions to the privilege, but when it was men-
tioned, it was in reference to confessions exacted by torture.' 6
It is not clear whether the privilege originally extended beyond protect-
ing a defendant in his own criminal trial. In 1892, however, the Supreme
Court, in Counselman v. Hitchcock,' 7 made it clear that the privilege extended
to grand jury proceedings and suggested that it might extend even further.' 8
Until 1964, the fifth amendment privilege was not binding on the
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional Histogy of the Privilege Against Setf-Incmination in
America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763 (1935).
11. Id. at 770.
12. Morgan, The Privilege Agaitst &lf-Insnmnatton, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1949).
13. Pittman, supra note 10, at 781.
14. Id at 783.
15. Id at 764-65.
16. Id at 788.
17. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
18. The Court stated:
It is impossible that the meaning of the constitutional privilege can only be, that a
person shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. . . . It would doubtless
cover such cases, but it is not limited to them. The object was to insure that a person
should not be compelled, when acting as a witness in any investigation, to give testi-
mony which might tend to show that he himself had committed a crime. The privi-
lege is limited to criminal matters, but it is as broad as the mischief against which it
seeks to guard.
Id. at 562.
Judge Friendly argues that once the phrase, "in any criminal case," has been read out of
the amendment, it has been all too tempting to take equal liberties with the term "compelled."
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow. The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 U. CINN. L. REV.
671 (1968).
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states.' 9 Convictions in state courts based on confessions were invalidated
only if they were obtained under such conditions as to violate principles of
due process under the fourteenth amendment.20 This standard changed,
however, when the Supreme Court, in Malloy v. Hogan,2' decided that the
fourteenth amendment "secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement."
22
Given this brief background of the development of the privilege, the
question arises of precisely what is protected by the privilege. The language
and history of the amendment provide some answers. For example, it is
clear that the privilege protects a defendant from being called to the witness
stand by the prosecution and being subjected under oath to questions
designed to incriminate him. It also protects him against being forced by
torture to confess. Beyond this, the language and history give little aid in
determining the scope of the privilege and we must turn to the interpreta-
tions of it by the Supreme Court.
B. The Miranda Rule
Prior to the decision in Miranda, the critical question in determining
whether a confession was obtained in violation of the Constitution was
whether it was "voluntary."' 23 This determination was made by an exami-
nation of the "totality of the circumstances. '24 The voluntariness test neces-
sitated an ad hoc inquiry into the facts of each case, resulting in a rather
subjective determination, as well as providing only very amorphous guide-
lines for police interrogators as to what conduct was permissible.
In Miranda, the court fashioned aper se rule to be applied in the deter-
mination of the validity of confessions. Concluding that the process of custo-
dial interrogation is "inherently compelling," the Court held that a suspect
must be "adequately and effectively" apprised of his rights,2 5 and that the
19. Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 (1961); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
20. Eg., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
21. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
22. Id at 7-8. Despite the Court's trend of expanding the scope of the fifth amendment,
some commentators, including Wigmore, Corwin, Pound, and Morgan have actually called for
the curtailment or elimination of the privilege. Friendly, supra note 18, at 672. McCormick
expressed his hope that:
as [the courts] become more conversant with the history of the privilege [they] will see
that it is a survival that has outlived the context that gave it meaning, and that its
application today is not to be extended under the influence of a vague sentimentality
but is to be kept within the limits of realism and common sense.
McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibiliy of Confessions, 24 TEx. L. REV. 239,
277 (1946).
Judge Friendly questions why it is more cruel to compel a man to testify against himself in
a misdemeanor trial than it is to compel him to testify against his mother on trial for her life.
Friendly, supra note 18, at 680.
This is not to suggest that these opinions in any way represent the majority view, only that
there is not unanimity among authorities about the scope and importance of the privilege.
23. E.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
24. Id at 514.
25. This is true regardless of whether the suspect in fact knew his rights. The Court stated:
[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of
his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact
with the authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
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exercise of those rights must be fully honored.2 6 Miranda requires that the
suspect be informed of his right to remain silent and that anything he says
can and will be used against him in court. 27 Further, the suspect must be
advised that he has the right to consult an attorney prior to questioning and
also to have counsel present during questioning. 28 The suspect must also be
advised that if he is indigent he has the right to an appointed attorney.
29
These protections are applicable once an individual is in custody at the po-
lice station or "otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way." 30 After the warnings have been given, if the suspect indicates either
prior to or during questioning that he wishes to remain silent, the interroga-
tion must end. 3' The Court concluded that any statement taken after the
invocation of the privilege "cannot be other than the product of compulsion,
subtle or otherwise."
32
One of the principal questions presented by Miranda is under what cir-
cumstances must the warnings be given. It is clear that a suspect who has
been arrested and is in custody is entitled to the warnings. 33 The application
of the privilege, however, to one who has been "deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way" has created a great deal of uncertainty. All of
the Supreme Court cases that have dealt with the definition of custodial
interrogation prior to Inni's have involved the definition of "custody" rather
than of "interrogation."'34 While some lower courts have addressed the issue,
they have reached inconsistent results.
35
II. FACTS OF RHODE ISLAND V. INNIS
On the night of January 16, 1975, the body of John Mulvaney, a Provi-
dence, Rhode Island, cab driver, was discovered in a shallow grave four days
after he disappeared. He had been shot in the back of the head with a shot-
gun. On January 17, shortly after midnigh, Gerald Aubin, also a taxi
driver, reported to police that he had just been robbed by a man carrying a
sawed-off shotgun, and had dropped the man off in the Mount Pleasant area
384 U.S. at 468-69. It is not clear why every man is presumed to know the law, but presumed
not to know his rights.
26. Id. at 467.
27. Id. at 469.
28. Id. at 470.
29. Id. at 473.
30. Id. at 477.
31. Id at 473-74.
32. Id. at 474.
33. Id. at 444.
34. In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court held that the subject of a
routine investigation should have been given Miranda warnings because at the time of the ques-
tioning he was in jail for an unrelated crime. In Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), the
Court held Miranda applicable to questioning which took place in the accused's bedroom, be-
cause although no actual arrest had occurred, the accused was not free to leave. In Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam), Miranda warnings were held not to be necessary
for questioning that took place in a police station when the suspect had come in voluntarily and
was free to go at any time. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), an IRS agent
who gave warnings that would have been inadequate under Miranda wa's held not to have vio-
lated a suspect's rights when the questioning took place in a private residence.
35. See notes 81-85 infa and accompanying text.
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of Providence. While at the police station, Aubin noticed a picture of his
assailant on a bulletin board and notified one of the police officers.
At approximately 4:30 a.m., a cruising patrolman spotted Innis, who
was arrested and advised of his rights. At that time, Innis was unarmed.
Within a few minutes a police sergeant arrived at the scene and once again
advised Innis of his rights. Immediately thereafter, Captain Leyden arrived
with other police officers. Captain Leyden also gave Innis the Miranda warn-
ings. At this point, Innis stated that he wished to speak to an attorney. 36
Captain Leyden then ordered Innis to be taken to the police station and
assigned Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and McKenna to accompany Innis
to the station. 37 Captain Leyden instructed the officers not to interrogate
Innis or to intimidate him in any way.
Apparently, almost immediately after the patrol car left the scene of the
arrest, Patrolman Gleckman began to talk with Patrolman McKenna about
the missing shotgun. Gleckman stated that there was a school for retarded
children in the area where they suspected that the shotgun was hidden, and
that "God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they
might hurt themselves."
'38
At this point, Innis interrupted the officers, telling them that they
should turn the car around and he would show them where the gun was
located. The police car returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for
the shotgun was underway. Once again, Captain Leyden advised Innis of
his rights. Innis stated that he understood his rights but that he wanted to
help find the gun because of his concern for the children. He then led the
police to where he had hidden the shotgun.
On March 20, 1976, Innis was indicted for kidnapping, robbery, and
murder. Prior to the trial, Innis' attorney moved to suppress the shotgun
and the statements made to the police. Finding that Innis had been "repeat-
edly and completely advised of his Miranda rights," the judge concluded that
Innis' decision to lead the police to the shotgun was an intelligent waiver of
his rights. The trial judge did not address the question of whether Innis had
in fact been "interrogated." Innis was convicted on all counts.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 5-2 decision, set aside the con-
viction, 39 holding that Innis had invoked his right to counsel and that, con-
trary to the mandate of Miranda,4° the police had continued to interrogate
him without a valid waiver of his rights. The Rhode Island Supreme Court
found that Innis was subjected to "subtle coercion" that was the equivalent
of interrogation, and also that the state had not carried its burden of estab-
lishing that there had been a waiver. 4'
36. 100 S. Ct. at 1686.
37. This was apparently an unusual procedure. Generally only two patrolmen would ac-
company a prisoner. Id at 1697 n.17 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 1686. The precise wording is unclear. Patrolman Williams testified that it would
be too bad if "a little girl" should hurt herself. Id at 1687.
39. 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978).
40. The Court in Miranda stated: "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the
interrogation must cease until an attorney is present." 384 U.S. at 474.
41. 391 A.2d at 1162-63. The Miranda Court stated that "[i]f the interrogation continues
1981]
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III. SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING
In a 6-3 decision, 42 the United States Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Rhode Island Supreme Court. Recognizing that "interrogation"
under Miranda covers more than express questioning, the Court nonetheless
held that Innis had not been interrogated for Miranda purposes. The Court
held that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus-
tody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.14 3
The functional equivalent of questioning includes "any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response from the suspect."'44 The Court observed that any
knowledge on the part of police of a defendant's unusual susceptibility to a
particular form of conduct might be an important factor in determining
whether the police should have known that their conduct was likely to elicit
a response. 45
The Court held that the circumstances of this case did not suggest that
Innis was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. The
Court found nothing in the record to suggest that the police knew that the
defendant was peculiarly susceptible to appeals to his conscience, nor was
there anything to suggest that they knew he was unusually disoriented or
upset. Furthermore, the Court held that the "offhand comments" were not
the sort of lengthy harangue calculated to overbear the will of a suspect.
The Court concluded that "[tihe Rhode Island Supreme Court erred . . . in
equating 'subtle compulsion' with interrogation."
'46
without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege
against self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel." 384 U.S. at 475.
42. justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Blackmun, Powell,
Rehnquist, and White joined. Justice White filed a concurring opinion stating that Innis had
waived his rights. Chief Justice Burger filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice
Marshall filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissent.
43. 100 S. Ct. at 1689.
44. Id (footnotes omitted).
45. Id. at 1690 n.8.
46. Id at 1691. Had the Court decided that Innis had been interrogated, the question of
waiver would have arisen. In light of the fact that Innis invoked his rights and the police
continued to interrogate him, the Court would probably not have found that Innis had volunta-
rily waived his rights, because such a situation would have amounted to a refusal of the police to
honor Innis' request to terminate the questioning.
The question of waiver is beyond the scope of this comment, but it does raise some interest-
ing issues. For example, precisely what is being waived? Waiver is generally spoken of as a
waiver of the right to remain silent, or of the right to counsel. Yet if custodial interrogation is
inherently coercive, and if appeals to one's conscience are a form of "subtle compulsion," a
waiver in such cases must be a waiver of the right not to be compelled to testify against oneself.
This reasoning is escapable only if one accepts the proposition that the giving of Miranda warn-
ings completely dispels the compulsion of custodial interrogation. It is difficult to see, however,
how the recital of a thirty second warning can burst the bubble of coercion assertedly associated
with all such interrogation.
Professor Jerold Israel has pointed out that if the Court feels the need to respond to the
arguments of those who urge a limitation on the exclusion of evidence under Miranda, it could
most effectively meet that need by enlarging its concept of "waiver." Thus, a waiver would not
necessarily be rendered invalid by the police's urging the suspect to confess, explaining the
evidence against him, or asking him to reconsider his decision to remain silent. This concept
[Vol. 58:3
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Chief Justice Burger, concurring in the judgment only,47 stated his un-
willingness to overrule, disparage, or expand Miranda. He did, however, ex-
press concern that the Court's test required a police officer to evaluate the
suggestibility and susceptibility of an accused. In addition to his concern
that police officers are not trained to make such judgments, he expressed his
feeling that the Court's test puts an additional burden on trial judges.48
Justice Marshall's dissent agreed that the majority had correctly defined
"interrogation," but disagreed with its application of the test to the facts. 4 9
He found Officer Gleckman's statements concerning the possibility of the
death of a helpless, handicapped girl to be a strong appeal to the conscience,
and stated that policemen are "chargeable with knowledge of and responsi-
bility for the pressures to speak which they [create]." 50 Although nominally
concurring with the test of the majority, this last statement seems to put
more responsibility on the police because it makes the police responsible for
any conduct which in fact evokes a statement, whether or not the police
"should have known" that it would.
In this respect, Justice Marshall's dissent parallels that of Justice Ste-
vens who argued for a broader definition of "functional equivalent of inter-
rogation." Taking issue with the majority's view that makes a finding of
interrogation dependent upon whether the police should have known that
what they were saying was likely to elicit a response, Justice Stevens argued
that the test should be whether a statement would normally be understood
by the average listener as calling for a response.51 Therefore, he argues, any
police conduct or statements that would appear to a reasonable person in the
suspect's position as calling for a response must be considered "interroga-
tion." Justice Stevens appears to go even further by stating that the defini-
tion of interrogation must include police conduct or statements that have the
same "purpose or effect" as a direct question.
52
In the case below, 53 the Rhode Island Supreme Court relied on stan-
dards set forth in Brewer v. W1illiams, 54 a 1977 case with facts superficially
similar to those in Innzs. Brewer involved a suspect who had been arrested
and arraigned in Davenport, Iowa, for the abduction, rape, and murder of a
ten-year-old girl. After his lawyer told police that Williams was not to be
interrogated, Williams was driven back to Des Moines. During the trip
back, one of the policemen made an appeal to Williams' conscience by what
has come to be known as the "Christian Burial Speech,' 55 after which, Wil-
would allow the Court to meet many of the objections of prosecutors, yet there would be no
need to modify most of the procedural safeguards announced in Miranda. Israel, Crrina/a Proce-
dure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1386 (1977).
47. 100 S. Ct. at 1691 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
48. Id (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49. Id at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
50. Id (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51. Id at 1694 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 1695 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53. State v. Innis, 391 A.2d 1158 (R.I. 1978).
54. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
55. Detective Learning said:
I want to give you something to think about while we're travelling down the
road. . . . I want you to observe the weather conditions. . . . They are predicting
1981]
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liams led the police to the girl's body. The Supreme Court ruled that Wil-
liams' sixth amendment right to counsel had been violated because the
detective had deliberately elicited the statement from Williams outside the
presence of counsel after adversary proceedings had begun.
In Innis, the Supreme Court rejected the Rhode Island court's reliance
on Brewer, stating that since judicial proceedings had not been initiated
against Innis, the protection of the sixth amendment had not attached. Fur-
thermore, the Court stated that because of the different policies underlying
the fifth and sixth amendments, the definitions of interrogation under the
two amendments are different, if in fact the term "interrogation" has any
meaning at all in the sixth amendment context. 56
IV. MIRANDA, INNS, AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
Undoubtedly, much ink will be spilled decrying the result in Innis and
characterizing it as one more instance of the Burger Court's trampling on
individual rights. Before we resign ourselves to a police state and prepare
ourselves for a revival of the Star Chamber, however, we should try dispas-
sionately to examine precisely what has happened: A man unquestionably
guilty of murder was convicted, based at least in part on a confession which
is difficult to describe as anything but voluntary, using the ordinary meaning
of the word. Unfortunately, however, the Court used some rather strained
logic in its first application of the test announced.
Even conceding that the reason behind Patrolman Gleckman's state-
ment was a faint hope that such an appeal to Innis' conscience would yield a
confession, it is difficult to argue that such a statement was "compelled" in
the fifth amendment sense of the word. Innis was not tortured, threatened,
intimidated, tricked, or in any way made to feel that a refusal to talk would
produce adverse consequences. Although not overruling or even expressly
limiting Miranda, this case may reflect a feeling by some members of the
Court that the varnish of Mtranda and its progeny has obscured the underly-
ing grain of the fifth amendment.
It seems to be a closer question whether Innis' Miranda rights were vio-
lated than whether he was compelled to testify against himself. The Miranda
Court stated that custodial interrogation "contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to com-
pel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," and that in
order to combat those pressures he must be advised of his rights and the
exercise of those rights must be honored. 57
Since one of the rationales for the Miranda holding was that custodial
several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only person that
knows where this little girl's body is... and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself
may be unable to find it .... [T]he parents of this little girl should be entitled to a
Christian burial for the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas
[ELve and murdered.
Id at 392-93. Learning then stated "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it
any further. Just think about it as we're driving down the road." Id
56. 100 S. Ct. at 1689 n.4.
57. 384 U.S. at 467.
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interrogation in the absence of adequate warnings or a valid waiver is inher-
ently coercive, it might be relevant to inquire into the pressures on the sus-
pect to speak to determine whether he was interrogated. That is, if all such
custodial interrogation is coercive, if it is found that the subject was not co-
erced, he could not have been interrogated in violation of his rights.
In the instant case, it is likely that Innis felt less pressure on himself to
speak than did those suspects in Miranda and its companion cases who were
subjected to long periods of incommunicado interrogation. It is also reason-
able to assume that a suspect feels less pressure to speak when confronted
with indirect, rather than direct, appeals. The difficulty lies in deciding
whether the pressure is diminished to such an extent that it no longer consti-
tutes compulsion.
One difficulty in defining "interrogation" in terms of compulsion is that
the definition being sought is in turn dependent upon another term difficult
to define-"compulsion." "Compulsion" could be defined strictly as physi-
cal force or the threat thereof, or it could include more "subtle compulsion,"
even compulsion so subtle that it might more accurately be described as "en-
couragement." In fact, for some supporters of the Miranda decision, the defi-
nition of "compulsion" actually does include "encouragement." '15
Undoubtedly, Innis received encouragement to speak, at least from his per-
spective, but it is more difficult to argue that he was compelled to speak.
The Court's decision in Innis may reflect a reluctance to read the fifth
amendment as stating that: "No person shall be encouraged to testify
against himself."
A further factor that the Court might have considered was that Innis
had been advised of his Miranda rights four times before he showed the police
where the shotgun was hidden. Although technically irrelevant because if
no interrogation took place it does not matter whether he was given the
warnings, the fact that he was given repeated warnings may be viewed as
putting Innis under less pressure to talk.
That the question of a violation of Miranda may be more difficult to
determine than the question of a violation of the fifth amendment, suggests
that Miranda may, at least in part, be predicated on grounds other than the
fifth amendment.59 There is language in Miranda and in more recent deci-
sions to support this proposition. In Miranda, the Court stated that "we can-
not say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process
as it is presently conducted. Our decision in no way creates a straitjacket
which will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this
58. Professor Kamisar states:
If the police conduct is designed and likely to pressure or persuade, or even "to exert a
tug on," a suspect to incriminate himself.., then that conduct is "compulsion" as
Miranda defines the self-incrimination clause. Then it augments or intenst s the tolera-
ble level of stress, confusion, and anxiety generated by unadulterated arrest and deten-
tion to the impermissible level of "compulsion."
Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is "Interrogation"? When Does it Mat-
ter?, 67 GEO. L.J. I, 23 (1978) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
59. See Sunderland, supra note 4, at 204.
1981]
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effect." 60
Further support for at least a partial nonconstitutional basis for Miranda
is found in the conclusive presumption that the Court created that, in any
given instance, if a defendant was not given warnings, he was not aware of
his rights.6 ' If the fifth amendment requires that a suspect have an opportu-
nity to exercise his rights in a knowing fashion, surely the critical question
should be whether he fully understands those rights, rather than whether a
particular formality was observed. This position is supported by cases hold-
ing that even if Miranda warnings were given, they are defective unless they
were understood.
62
In Michigan v. Tucker, 63 the Court was presented with the question of
whether the testimony of a witness in a rape trial should be excluded because
police had learned the identity of the witness by questioning the suspect
when he had not been given the full Miranda warnings.6 In an opinion by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court stated, "We will therefore first consider
whether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon respon-
dent's right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated
only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right."'65 The Tucker Court fur-
ther characterized the Miranda rules as "recommended 'procedural safe-
guards,' "66 and went on to say "The [Miranda] Court recognized that these
procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitu-
tion but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
self-incrimination was protected.
'67
The question of whether verbatim Miranda warnings are actually man-
dated by the Constitution is of great significance. If these warnings are not
themselves constitutionally required, then federal courts may not reverse
state court judgments on the ground that the Miranda warnings were not
given or were in some way deficient; the federal courts may only inquire
whether the right against compulsory self-incrimination was violated.
68
Moreover, the point has recently been made that even the supervisory
powers of the federal courts over federal prosecutions may be limited. In
oral arguments before the Supreme Court in the search-and-seizure case of
United States v. Payner,69 Solicitor General Wade H. McCree, Jr., argued that
Federal Rule of Evidence 40270 places stringent limits on the federal courts'
60. 384 U.S. at 467.
61. See note 25 supra. As a result of this rule, if Chief Justice Warren, the author of the
Miranda opinion, had been arrested and not given the warnings, there would have been a con-
clusive presumption that he was unaware of them.
62. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976) (statements made by intoxi-
cated suspect inadmissible), rev'don othergrounds, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
63. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
64. Tucker had been advised of all his rights except that he would be furnished counsel
free of charge if he could not afford to pay for assistance himself. Id. at 436.
65. Id at 439 (emphasis added).
66. Id at 443.
67. Id at 444.
68. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 38 (1972).
69. 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
70. FED. R. EVID. 402 states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution
[Vol. 58:3
RHODE ISLAND v. INNIS
exercise of their supervisory powers to suppress relevant evidence. 7' There-
fore, he argued, in the absence of some statutory or constitutional provision
permitting it, the federal courts may not exclude relevant evidence. 72 Find-
ing that the lower court had violated the already established rule that a
court may not exclude evidence under the fourth amendment unless the de-
fendant's own constitutional rights were violated, 73 the Court apparently
found it unnecessary to address the rule 402 argument. This does point up,
however, the significant consequences of finding that Miranda is based upon
the supervisory power rather than the constitution.
V. ANALYTICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE INNIS TEST
The preceding discussion was intended to explore some possible reasons
for the Court's holding in Innis. It is now pertinent to discuss some problems
associated with the test formulated by the Court.
While the particular result in Innis may appear to be an aberration in
terms of the application of the test to the facts, 74 the test laid down in the
opinion seems to be a sound compromise between the rights of the suspect
and the need for effective police work. There are some ironies involved,
however. By defining interrogation as express questioning or "any words or
actions on the part of the police. . . that the police should know are reason-
ably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect," 7 5 the Court
is implicitly condoning the use of techniques that the police reasonably be-
lieve are unlikely to evoke an incriminating response. In other words, it is
permissible for the police to take a long shot, but not for them to use tech-
niques with a reasonable probability of success. Intent on the part of the
police to elicit a statement, though not irrelevant, is not determinative. 76
The Court does state, however, that intent might have a bearing on whether
the police should have known that their words or actions were likely to elicit
a response.
77
As Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his concurrence, the Court's test
may introduce a new element of uncertainty into police work because the
police must evaluate the susceptibility of an accused. This is a very real
concern since it is not necessary that the police knew that their conduct was
likely to elicit a response; it is enough that they should have known. This
test seems to mean that if the police had stopped to think, it would have
of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by
the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is
not admissible.
71. 26 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 4212 (1980).
72. In response to a question by Justice Stevens asking if Solicitor General McCree was
asking the Court to overrule Miranda, McCree replied in the negative because of his belief that
Miranda seems to have some fifth amendment underpinning. Id at 4213.
73. United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. 2439, 2442 (1980).
74. 100 S. Ct. at 1692 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 1689 (footnotes omitted).
76. Id. at 1690 n.7.
77. It is likely that a practice which is designed to elicit a response will be one which the
police should have known was likely to have that effect. Id.
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occurred to them. It is not always possible, however, for police to stop to
think.
The Court added even more confusion when it stated that the definition
of interrogation "focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect,
rather than the intent of the police."78 It is not clear precisely what this
means. It appears to mean that if the suspect perceives that the police
should have known that their conduct was reasonably likely to elicit an in-
criminating response, then the police conduct constitutes interrogation. This
is not an easy test to apply. The difficulty with this standard can be illus-
trated by slightly varying the facts of the Innis case. Suppose Innis had a
mentally retarded daughter at the school for handicapped children in the
neighborhood where the gun was hidden, and he erroneously assumed that
the police had found out about her during their investigation. It would
probably appear to Innis that the police should have known that their state-
ments were likely to elicit a response; yet, the police would have no way of
knowing that this was a situation any different from the actual facts of lnnis.
In light of the Court's view that deterrence of illegal police conduct is the
major reason for Miranda,79 it seems somewhat anomalous to base a decision
whether a confession should be excluded on factors over which the police
have no control and which they have no way of assessing.
VI. THE IMPACT OF INNIS ON THE FUTURE
Since Miranda also condemned the use of psychological ploys that do
not amount to direct questioning,80 it might seem, at first glance, that Inni's
adds little to the law of confessions. There is one line of confession cases,
however, on which the decision in Inni's may have a significant impact.
These are cases where the suspect is shown evidence against him, either prior
to Miranda warnings or after he has invoked his right to remain silent. Al-
though the Supreme Court has never addressed this question, a number of
lower courts have, with varying results.
In Combs v. Wingo, 8 ' after the defendant was arrested for murder and his
Miranda rights were explained to him, he told police that he wanted to make
a statement, but wanted to talk to an attorney first. The policeman agreed,
but immediately read the ballistics report to Combs, who then began to talk.
The court held that Combs' rights had been violated.
A similar result was reached in Commonwealth v. Hamilton ,82 in which the
defendant made incriminating statements after being confronted with the
confession of a co-conspirator. The court held that the relevant inquiry in
determining whether there had been interrogation was whether a confession
was expected or reasonably likely to be elicited. The court held the state-
ments inadmissible.
Contrary results have been reached in other cases. In United States v.
78. Id at 1689-90.
79. E.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
80. 384 U.S. at 450.
81. 465 F.2d 96 (6th Cir. 1972).
82. 445 Pa. 292, 285 A.2d 172 (1971).
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Hodge,83 the suspect was arrested for armed robbery on a military base. Af-
ter Hodge invoked his rights, the investigator terminated the interview and
then informed Hodge of the military procedure to obtain counsel and ex-
plained the charges and the evidence against him. Hodge then changed his
mind and volunteered a statement. The court held that his subsequent
statements were admissible.
In United States v. Davis,84 the suspect in a bank robbery invoked his
right to remain silent. An F.B.I. agent then showed Davis a picture of Davis
at the bank during the robbery and asked "Are you sure you don't want to
reconsider?" Davis studied the picture and then said, "Well, I guess you've
got me." His subsequent statements were ruled admissible, the court hold-
ing that the F.B.I. agent merely asked Davis if he wanted to reconsider his
decision, and that the interrogation did not resume until after Davis had
voluntarily agreed that it should.
In United States v. Pheaster,85 the court similarly held that statements
evoked by an objective, undistorted presentation of the evidence were not
products of interrogation.
Given the test announced in Innis, it seems fairly clear that all state-
ments elicited by a presentation to a suspect of the evidence against him
should be considered the product of interrogation. The police should know
that showing a suspect the evidence against him is likely to elicit an incrimi-
nating response, and in fact, that is probably their reason for doing so.
Whether such action involves actual compulsion is another matter. Cer-
tainly it is an encouragement to speak, but it is not as clear that the suspect's
will is overborne to such an extent that his decision to speak is a product of
compulsion.
At this writing, two state courts have applied the Innis test to such cases
and have held that the statements elicited were the products of interroga-
tion.8 6 In Nebraska v. Durand,8 7 the defendant was arrested and given the
Miranda warnings. When asked whether he would like to make a statement,
he replied in the negative. He was then shown police reports of other crimes
of which he was suspected and again advised of his rights. The statement he
then gave was held inadmissible under Innzs, because it was elicited by the
"functional equivalent" of interrogation, and the police should have known
that showing Durand the police reports was likely to evoke an incriminating
response.
In People v. Bodner,8 8 the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
83. 487 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1973).
84. 527 F.2d I 110 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 953 (1976).
85. 544 F.2d 353 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977).
86. A third case has been decided based upon Innti, but the facts in that case are somewhat
different. In State v. Jones, 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2342 (June 23, 1980), the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the comments by a policeman to a man suspected of killing his child
to the effect that "God takes care of little babies" and that "the baby was already in heaven"
were more in the nature of consolation than interrogation. Moreover, the court held that even
if the comments were interrogation, the admission of the statements elicited constituted harm-
less error.
87. 406 Neb. 415, 293 N.W.2d 383 (1980).
88. 27 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2414 (July 10, 1980).
1981]
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
Court reached a similar result. In that case, a seventeen-year-old mentally
retarded youth named Dwayne voluntarily went to the police station and
told a detective whom he knew well that his cousin had intentionally started
a series of fires. Dwayne took the detective around and showed him where
and how his cousin had supposedly set the fires. The detective told Dwayne
to go home and then went to interview the cousin. The interview convinced
the detective that the cousin was innocent, so the detective summoned
Dwayne and one of his parents back to the police station. The detective told
Dwayne, "We checked out your cousin's alibi, and he was telling the truth."
Dwayne responded, "I did. I lied to you." At that point he was given Mi-
randa warnings, and shortly thereafter he signed a full confession.8 9
The court applied Innz' and held that the policeman's statement was
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and since the court
found that the "interrogation" had occurred in a custodial setting, it should
have been preceded by the Miranda warnings. The court stated that telling
Dwayne that his cousin could not have set the fires was the same as telling
Dwayne that he knew Dwayne was lying and had set the fires himself.9°
Although lower courts have heretofore differed on the admissibility of
statements elicited by the disclosure to suspects of incriminating evidence,
the Inni's opinion will probably result in a general exclusion of statements so
obtained. 9' There can be little doubt about the motives of the police in
disclosing the evidence and they should know that disclosure is reasonably
likely to evoke an incriminating response.
CONCLUSION
The result in Innis may be illustrative of a disenchantment of a majority
of the Court with the Mranda rules and the Court's reluctance to rule inad-
missible statements obtained in the absence of actual coercion or highly im-
proper police techniques. Innis reflects the Court's movement toward a
'voluntariness-totality of the circumstances" test in situations that do not
fall squarely within the ambit of the Miranda decision.
Although the test in Innis may be quite reasonable, the application of
the test to the facts is less so. Despite the fact that the Court found that
Patrolman Gleckman's statement consisted merely of a few "offhand re-
marks," it defies credibility to assert that he had not considered the possible
impact of his statement on Innis. Although the result in this case may have
squared with the fifth amendment, it is difficult to reconcile the result in the
case with the test announced by the Court.
Constitutionally, there appears to be no reason not to abandon Miranda,
and look in each case to the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a suspect was actually compelled to be a witness against himself.
Practically, however, this would likely have the effect of increasing the bur-
89. Id
90. Arguably, under the rationale of Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per
curiam), Dwayne was not in custody.
91. Unless, of course, the Court is willing to expand its definition of "waiver." See note 46
supra.
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den on federal courts by requiring an inquiry into the specific facts of each
case. 9 2 Yet, it is questionable whether administrative convenience is suffi-
cient justification for the intrusion on state sovereignty that adherence to
Miranda in state court proceedings entails.
The primary impact of Innis will likely be in those cases in which the
police present incriminating evidence to the suspect either prior to the Mi-
randa warnings being given, or after an invocation by the suspect of his
rights. A reasoned application of the test announced in Inni's will result in
exclusion of evidence so obtained. In a sense, it is ironic that the primary
impact of this decision-a decision which will almost certainly be heavily
criticized by civil libertarians-will probably be to afford suspects a greater
measure of protection while they are in police custody than they previously
enjoyed.
Kingsley R. Browne
92. It should be borne in mind, however, that Miranda does not completely abolish the
need to look into the totality of the circumstances; it merely prescribes one element that must be
present in order to hold a confession admissible. See, e.g., Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
1981]
